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Who gains, and by how much, from government saving incentives? This
question is tough to answer because the tax code has myriad interacting
provisions, many of which are difficult to appreciate fully. Take, for exam-
ple, workers who contribute to 401 (k) plans. They lower their current
taxes, but they also raise their future taxes. How much their taxes decline
when the workers are young and rise when they are old depends on their
tax brackets when they are young and old. But these brackets can change
dramatically in response to the size of 401 (k) contributions and withdraw-
als. Changes in tax brackets will, in turn, change the tax savings from
mortgage interest payments and other tax deductions. In addition, the
level of withdrawals can trigger higher federal income taxation of social
security benefits and the phaseout of itemized deductions under the fed-
eral income tax. Clearly, measuring the net gains from tax-favored saving
requires a model of lifetime saving, spending, and tax payments. It also
requires detailed federal income, state income, and payroll tax calculators,
because all three taxes are potentially altered by contributions to tax-
favored accounts. Economic Security Planner (ESPlanner™), developed
by Economic Security Planning, Inc., is a life-cycle financial planning
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model with highly detailed tax and social security benefit calculators that
can assess the lifetime tax and spending implications of different types
and levels of tax-favored saving.
We used ESPlanner™ (Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 2001) to study the size
and pattern of tax breaks to saving. Our analysis, based on tax law prior
to 2001, reached the remarkable conclusion that participating fully in
401 (k) or similar tax-deferred saving plans raises the lifetime tax pay-
ments of low-income households who earn moderate to high rates of re-
turn! This finding is driven in large part by increased federal income
taxation of social security benefits when 401 (k) assets are withdrawn. Our
study was written, however, prior to the enactment of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA). EGTRRA
greatly expands the limits on contributions to tax-deferred accounts, in-
cluding 401 (k), 403b, Keogh, and traditional IRA plans. It also raises the
limit on contributions to non-tax-deductible Roth IRAs. Most important
for the issue of tax fairness, however, it provides a significant but little
known nonrefundable tax credit for qualified account contributions up
to $2,000 made by low-earning workers.
This paper reviews the pre-EGTRRA lifetime tax gains (or losses) avail-
able to low-, middle-, and high-lifetime earners from participating fully
in 401 (k) accounts, traditional IRA accounts, and Roth IRA accounts. It
then shows how these subsidies have been changed by the new legisla-
tion. The paper's bottom line is that EGTRRA mitigates, but doesn't fully
eliminate, the lifetime tax increases facing many low-income households
from making significant contributions to tax-deferred retirement ac-
counts. Additional research is needed to understand how many low- and
moderate-income households are paying higher taxes, at the margin, due
to their saving through such accounts. Our sense is that most low- and
moderate-income households are contributing less than the maximum
possible amount to these accounts and are, thereby, limiting their losses.
But even these households are being ill served because they have been
told by the government, their employers, and their financial advisers that
saving in tax-deferred accounts will deliver major tax savings.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the social security system under financial pressure from the im-
pending retirement of the Baby Boom generation, the government is try-
ing to encourage additional saving through retirement accounts. The
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA)
greatly expanded the limits on contributions to tax-deductible accounts,
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contribution limits of non-tax-deductible Roth IRAs. And, in a less well-
known provision, it provided a significant nonrefundable tax credit to
low-income workers for qualified contributions up to $2,000.
The debate on these provisions proceeded with little discussion of the
gains to potential winners. And they proceeded with no discussion of
the losses to potential losers because the general presumption was that
participating in tax-favored saving vehicles could only benefit workers
by reducing their lifetime taxes. As demonstrated in our recent study
(Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 2001), this view is true for high-income workers
but mistaken for low- and moderate-income workers who participate
fully in 401 (k) and similar tax-deferred saving plans.
How can workers end up with higher lifetime taxes and lower lifetime
spending by saving in a tax-deferred plan?
1 The answer is simply by rais-
ing their taxes in old age by more than they lower them when the taxpay-
ers are young, where taxes when they are young and when they are old
are measured in terms of their value when young—what economists call
their present value. Can this scenario really happen? It surely can, for
four reasons. First, relatively large withdrawals from 401 (k) and other
tax-deferred accounts can place one in higher, indeed much higher, tax
brackets during retirement than during one's working years. Second, the
government can raise taxes during one's retirement. Third, significant
contributions to tax-deferred retirement accounts can place one in lower
tax brackets when young, which will, in turn, reduce the value of mort-
gage interest and other deductions. Fourth, and very important, shifting
taxable income from youth to old age can substantially increase the share
of social security benefits that become subject to federal income taxation.
This paper uses Economic Security Planner (ESPlanner™), developed
by Economic Security Planning, Inc., to calculate the gains or losses from
contributing to tax-deferred as well as non-tax-deferred retirement ac-
counts. ESPlanner™ is a life-cycle financial planning model with highly
detailed tax and social security benefit calculators. Its purpose is to help
households maintain their living standards as they age. ESPlanner™ takes
into account a host of economic and demographic factors. It can be used
to evaluate the gains or losses from contributing to retirement accounts
by simply running the program under different assumptions about retire-
ment account contributions and comparing the results.
Applying ESPlanner™ to representative worker households generates
some surprising conclusions. We start with workers contributing fully to
a typical 401 (k) under the old tax law, specifically, a typical 25-year-old
1 The terms lifetime taxes and lifetime spending refer to the present values as of the beginning
of one's adult life of all future tax payments and expenditures.114 Gokhale & Kotlikoff
couple who initially earns $50,000 (each spouse earns $25,000), contributes
to a 401(k), earns a 6 percent real rate of return on its investments, and
experiences 1 percent real wage growth.
2 Rather than lowering lifetime
taxes, 401 (k) participation raises the couple's lifetime tax payments by 1.1
percent and lowers lifetime expenditures by 0.4 percent. The lifetime tax
hike is 6.4 percent, and the lifetime spending reduction is 1.7 percent if
the couple earns an 8 percent real rate of return. These figures rise to 7.3
percent and 2.3 percent, respectively, if taxes are increased by 20 percent
when the couple retires—a realistic possibility given the federal govern-
ment's long-term finances.
Compare these results with those for a couple initially earning $300,000
per year ($150,000 per spouse) who also contributes fully.
3 Assuming a 6
percent real rate of return, this high-income couple receives a 6.7 percent
lifetime tax break from 401(k) participation, which translates into a 3.8
percent increase in lifetime spending. At an 8 percent rate of return, these
figures are 4.2 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively. Such couples would
enjoy a very large lifetime subsidy even if tax rates were raised by as
much as one-fifth when they retire.
These findings, while striking, neglect EGTRRA, which greatly ex-
panded the limits on contributions to tax-deductible accounts, including
401 (k), 403b, Keogh, and traditional IRA plans. It also raised the limit on
contributions to non-tax-deductible Roth IRAs. Most important for the
issue of tax fairness, however, it provided a nonrefundable tax credit for
qualified account contributions up to $2,000 made by low-earning work-
ers. Depending on the income of the contributor, the credit can equal as
much as 50 cents per dollar contributed.
The impact of the credit on poor workers depends on its longevity and
erosion via inflation. According to the law, the credit will end in 2007, and
prior to 2007 there will be no adjustment to the nominal income levels at
which the credit is phased out. If these provisions are retained, the tax credit
will do little to nullify the lifetime tax hike that low-income households
potentially face from participating in tax-deferred retirement plans.
On the other hand, if the law is extended beyond 2007 and the adjusted
gross income (AGI) limits that determine eligibility are indexed to keep
pace with inflation, the credit will make tax-deferred saving by low-
income workers at least a breakeven proposition. For couples with some-
2 This couple's initial 401 (k) contribution is set at $6,500 per spouse, and its employers'
contribution is set at $1,500 per spouse. Both contributions are assumed to grow in real
terms by 1 percent, in line with the couple's projected real wage growth.
3 In this case, each spouse's initial contribution is set at the new legal employee contribution
maximum of $10,500, and the employer's initial contribution is set at $4,500 per spouse, the
typical employer-matching rate. Each of these contribution amounts is assumed to grow in
real terms by 1 percent, in line with the couple's projected real wage growth.Who Gets Paid to Save? 115
what higher incomes, the tax credits, even if temporary and nonindexed,
are more meaningful because such couples pay enough taxes to receive
the full value of the nonrefundable credit.
Even if the credit were made permanent and indexed to inflation,
moderate-income households would not qualify for the credit and would
still face higher lifetime taxes from full 401 (k) participation. And while
low-income workers would gain rather than lose from 401 (k) participa-
tion, their gains would remain extremely small compared to those pro-
vided to high-income workers.
In contrast to the possible losses or, at best, small gains facing low-
income workers from tax-deferred contributions, participating in a Roth
IRA provides a guaranteed and nontrivial lifetime tax saving. Unlike a
401 (k) plan, a Roth IRA does not permit the deduction of contributions.
On the other hand, neither principal nor accrued capital income are sub-
ject to taxation at the time of withdrawal. The Roth IRA is a good deal
for low-income workers even in the absence of the new credit. The new
credit, if made permanent and indexed to inflation, would significantly
improve the tax savings available to the poor from contributing to a
Roth IRA.
Indeed, because the Roth IRA provides an unambiguous tax advantage
to the poor, it could be used as the basis for equalizing the tax savings
across different income groups. As discussed here, limiting all workers
to contributing at most $2,000 to a Roth IRA would convert a highly re-
gressive public policy into one that delivers roughly the same percentage
reduction in lifetime tax payments for all workers.
This paper shows the ambiguous sign of the tax benefit to 401 (k) partici-
pation. It then describes ESPlanner™ and the stylized young households
used in our analysis. Next come the findings, which are presented under
a range of alternative assumptions about rates of return, wage growth,
and future tax rates. These findings raise several policy questions, many
of which are discussed in the conclusion.
2. THE AMBIGUOUS TAX ADVANTAGE TO
401(k) PARTICIPATION
To see the ambiguous nature of the lifetime tax effect of participating in
a 401 (k), consider an agent who lives for two periods, earning a wage of
W when young and facing a rate of return of r. Suppose the agent contrib-
utes an amount H to her 401 (k) plan when young. Then her lifetime bud-
get constraint is given by:
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where Yo stands for taxable income in old age apart from social security
benefits, i.e.:
Yo = (W - Ty(W - H - Dy) - H - Cy)r + H(l + r) - Do
where
Cy and Co equal consumption when young and old, respectively
M(B,Y0) equals the amount of taxable social security benefits
Dy and Do, equals deductions when young and old, respectively and
Ty( ) and To( ) are tax functions determining income-tax payments when
young and old
Note that taxable income when young is computed by deducting 401 (k)
contributions, whereas taxable income when old is computed by includ-
ing principal plus interest earned on the contribution.
If social security benefits were not subject to taxation (M(B,Y0) — 0) and
both tax functions were a fixed tax rate, x, times their respective tax bases,
the household's lifetime budget constraint would equal:
Cy
 +
 Co = W-x(W-H-DM)
(1 + r) (2)
_ t[(W - x(W - H - Dy) - H - Cv)r + 1 + r)H - Do]
(1 + r)
The right-hand side of equation (2) is wages less the present value of





y (1 + r)
- x(l - x)
(1 + r)_
Lifetime net taxes are now written as the lifetime taxes that would be paid
without 401 (k) contributions less the lifetime tax benefit of contributing to
the 401 (k). Holding Cy fixed, the larger is H, the smaller is the agent's
lifetime tax payment. Thus, if tax rates are constant and additional taxableWho Gets Paid to Save? 117
income in old age doesn't trigger additional taxation of social security
benefits, the direct impact of contributing to a 401 (k) plan is a reduction
in lifetime taxes.
Such contributions may also lower lifetime taxes indirectly through
their effect on consumption when young. Specifically, if the household
is doing positive saving outside the 401 (k), 401(k) contributions will be
intramarginal. In this case, the reduction in lifetime taxes from 401 (k) con-
tributions will likely be spent, in part, on more consumption when young.
This spending will lower non-401 (k) saving and the income taxes paid
when old on non-401 (k) asset income. If all saving is done through the
401 (k), non-401 (k) saving, (W - x (W - H - Dy) - H - Cy), will equal
0, and lifetime taxes will consist solely of taxes on labor earnings net of
deductions.
4
Next, consider equation (2) and assume that tax rates are invariant to
the tax base, but different when the agent is young and when the agent




= W - k(W - P,) +
r) 1/ " (1 + r) (5)
From equation (5), it's clear that lifetime taxes can be increased by contrib-
uting to a 401 (k) if the tax rate when the worker is old, x0/ is sufficiently
high compared with the tax rate when young, xy.
Prior to EGTRRA, the U.S. federal income tax had five marginal tax
brackets with rates of 15 percent, 28 percent, 31 percent, 36 percent, and
39.6 percent. In the case of a married couple filing jointly, the correspond-
ing taxable income tax brackets for 2001 were $0 to $45,200, $45,201 to






























* Effective July 1, 2001.
$109,250, $109,251 to $166,550, $166,551 to $297,350, and $297,351 or more.
These bracket amounts, which are indexed to inflation, are used in our
initial calculations. We also used the then-prevailing Massachusetts state
income tax rate of 5.95 percent, which was levied on every dollar of tax-
able income. Of course, exemptions and deductions can make federal or
state taxable income negative; in which case, no tax is assessed, although
the household may receive refundable tax credits of various kinds.
Under EGTRRA, a new 10 percent tax-rate bracket was introduced for
a portion of taxable income previously taxed at the 15 percent marginal
rate. For married couples, the taxable-income bracket for the new lower
marginal rate is $12,000 through 2007. Thereafter the bracket increases to
$14,000. These amounts are not indexed for inflation. Other tax rates will
gradually be reduced through 2010, based on the schedule shown in Table
1. In addition, new provisions relating to gradually eliminating the mar-
riage tax penalty; eliminating the phaseout of exemptions, deductions,
and child and earned income tax credits; and incorporating a new nonre-
fundable credit against contributions to qualified plans are taken into ac-
count in the calculations implemented here. Massachusetts state income
tax was also reduced, from 5.95 percent to 5.85 percent, at roughly the
same time that EGTRRA was passed.
While the current U.S. federal income tax provides low- and middle-
income households with lots of scope for moving into higher tax brackets,
compound interest is a very powerful force, and one might expect that
in a multi-period model, the value of tax deferral would outweigh most
increases in marginal tax rates that a 401 (k) contributor might experience.
However, the progressivity of the tax schedule is only one reason that a
401 (k) contributor, particularly those in low tax brackets, might wonder
about the size of his or her ultimate tax savings. Another reason is the
value of tax deductions. Although we've left it out of the notation, the
tax rates xy and x0 are themselves increasing functions of their respective
tax bases.
5 Hence, the larger is H, the smaller will be xy and the larger will
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be t0. If Dy > Do, raising H may lower the value of the tax deductions; it
will definitely do so if Do equals 0. Mortgage interest deductions are gen-
erally the largest deduction for those who itemize and such deductions
are concentrated in youth, so 401 (k) participation has the potential to re-
duce the value of tax deductions.
A final and very important factor in assessing the tax implications of
401 (k) participation is the taxation of social security benefits. If the func-
tion determining the amount of social security benefits that are included
in taxable income, M(B,Y0), is increasing in Yo, larger contributions to
401 (k) plans will raise Yo and thereby raise the amount of taxes paid on
social security benefits.
How much of social security benefits are included in federal AGI de-
pends on a pair of dollar limits—call them Xx and X2. For single filers,
these limits are $25,000 and $34,000, respectively. For joint filers, they are
$32,000 and $44,000, respectively. These limits are not indexed for infla-
tion: as nominal incomes rise, an ever-larger share of benefits becomes
subject to income taxation.
6
To determine the amount of social security benefits that must be in-
cluded in federal AGI, we first calculate provisional income—which is mod-
ified AGI (non-social security income, including tax-exempt interest) plus
half the social security benefit. If provisional income exceeds Xu but not
X2, half the excess over Xt or half the social security benefit, whichever
is smaller, is included in AGI. If provisional income exceeds X2/ then the
amount to be included equals the smaller of two items: (1) 50 percent of
benefits or $6,000, whichever is smaller, plus 85 percent of the excess of
provisional income over X2, and (2) 85 percent of benefits.
This formula is rather complicated. To understand its implications, Ta-
ble 2 and Figure 1 present the share of social security that is taxable for
different combinations of social security benefits and the non-social secu-
rity component of AGI (other income). The table and figure incorporate
high nominal values of social security benefits because when currently
young workers begin receiving their benefits, their nominal values will
be substantially higher than they are today. For example, with a 3 percent
rate of inflation, the equivalent of a $25,000 benefit in 2001 dollars would
be $81,551 in 2040. The share of social security benefits subject to taxation
is highly sensitive to the level of other income and somewhat sensitive
to the level of benefits. Also note that, for the range of nominal social
security benefits shown, the taxable share of benefits equals its maximum
6 The nonindexation of these limits appears to be the brainchild of David Stockman, Presi-
dent Reagan's first director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Stockman
viewed this method as a way of making necessary cuts in net benefits through time without
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value of 85 percent for levels of other income of $100,000 or more. Because
of social security's taxable earnings ceiling, however, benefits are capped
for very high earners. Hence, there's no scope for 401 (k) participation to
increase benefit taxation for very-high-income households.
With progressive taxes; multiple periods of life; the option to itemize
deductions, exemptions, and tax credits; and the federal and, in some
cases, state taxation of social security benefits, deriving an explicit formula
for lifetime tax payments becomes intractable. But one can use ESPlan-
ner™ to calculate annual tax payments and form their present value. Fur-
thermore, one can run ESPlanner™ with and without 401 (k) contributions
to determine the change in lifetime taxes from 401 (k) participation and
to determine its impact on the present value of lifetime spending.
3. ESPlanner™
ESPlanner™ smoothes a household's living standard over its life cycle to
the extent possible without having the household go into debt beyond
the mortgage. The program has highly detailed federal income tax, state
income tax, social security payroll tax, and social security benefit calcula-
tors. The federal and state income-tax calculators determine whether the
household should itemize its deductions, compute deductions and ex-
emptions, deduct contributions to tax-deferred retirement accounts from
taxable income, include in taxable income withdrawals from such ac-
counts as well as the taxable component of social security benefits, and cal-
culate total tax liabilities after all applicable refundable and nonrefundable
tax credits. These calculations are made separately for each year that the
couple is alive as well as for each year a surviving spouse may be alive.
7
The program also takes into account the nonfungible nature of housing,
bequest plans, economies of shared living, the presence of children under
age 19, and the desire of households to make "off-the-top" expenditures
on college tuition, weddings, and other special expenses. Finally, ESPlan-
ner™ calculates simultaneously the amounts of life insurance needed by
each spouse to guarantee that potential survivors suffer no decline in their
living standards compared with the living standard that each spouse
helped maintain.
ESPlanner™ calculates time-paths of consumption expenditure, taxable
saving, and term-life insurance holdings in constant (2001) dollars. Con-
sumption in this context is everything the household can spend after
paying for its "off-the-top" expenditures—housing expenses, special ex-
7 More details about the program are available in the manual and in research papers, which
can be downloaded at www.esplanner.com.Who Gets Paid to Save? 123
penditures, life insurance premiums, special bequests, taxes, and net con-
tributions to tax-favored accounts. Given the household's demographic
information, preferences, and borrowing constraints, ESPlanner™ uses
dynamic programming to determine the highest sustainable and smooth-
est possible living standard over time, leaving the household with zero
terminal assets apart from the equity in homes that the user has chosen
not to sell.
ESPlanner™'s principal outputs are recommended time-paths of con-
sumption expenditure, taxable saving, and term-life insurance holdings.
The amount of recommended consumption expenditures varies from year
to year in response to changes in the household's composition. It also
rises when the household moves from a situation of being constrained
from borrowing to one of being unconstrained. Finally, recommended
household consumption will change over time if users intentionally spec-
ify that they want their living standard to change. For example, if users
specify that they desire a 10 percent higher living standard after a certain
year in the future, the software will incorporate that preference in making
its recommendations, provided that it does not violate a borrowing con-
straint. This borrowing constraint does not apply to mortgage debt, which
the user can freely specify. The user can also specify the amount of non-
mortgage debt that the household is willing to incur to facilitate the
smoothing of its living standard. In this study, we specify the nonmort-
gage debt limit at 0.
In our use of ESPlanner™ for this study, we consider how contributing
to retirement accounts affects the present values of a household's total
tax payments and spending, which is defined as the sum of consumption
expenditures, special expenditures, housing expenditures, and life insur-
ance premiums.
4. OUR STYLIZED COUPLES
Our stylized couples consist of a husband and wife, both of whom are
age 25 and live at most to age 95. Each spouse works to age 65 and earns
half of the household's total earnings, which range from $25,000 to $1
million per year when they are 25. Real earnings grow annually by 1 per-
cent. The couples live in Massachusetts and have no initial assets apart
from their homes. Each couple has two children. The first is born when
the couple is age 25 and the second when the couple is age 30. The market
value of each couple's house is set at three times the household labor
earnings as of age 25.
The couples purchase their homes at age 25 by paying 20 percent down
and borrowing the remainder at 8 percent for 30 years. Annual home-224 Gokhale & Kotlikoff
owner's insurance, property taxes, and maintenance are set at 0.17 per-
cent, 1 percent, and 1 percent of house value, respectively. Each child
attends college for four years. A couple earning $25,000 per year spends,
by assumption, $7,500 per child for each year of college. This college ex-
pense is set at $15,000 for couples earning $50,000 and $30,000 for couples
earning $100,000 or $150,000. For couples earning $200,000 or more per
year, annual college expenses are capped at $35,000. There are no bequests
apart from the value of home equity, which the couple chooses not to sell.
5. CONTRIBUTION LEVELS
Our calculations assume elective employee contributions and employer
matching contributions equal to the average of maximum contributions
permitted by employer-provided defined contribution plans. The house-
hold's elective contribution is set at 13.5 percent of earnings. The em-
ployer-matching contribution is set at 3 percent of earnings. Hence, 401 (k)
contributions total 16.5 percent of earnings. At this contribution rate, the
contribution ceiling limits the household's combined elective and em-
ployer contribution to $60,000 at earnings exceeding $363,636.36.
8 We as-
sume that this ceiling rises with real wages at the assumed 1 percent real
growth rate. In modeling the old tax law, we also apply the current
$10,500 limit on elective individual contributions and assume that limit
also grows with real wages. In modeling the new tax law, we adhere to
the increase in nominal contribution limits specified through 2006 (from
$11,000 in 2001 by $1,000 per year to reach $15,000 in 2006), and then
allow those limits to grow with real wages.
9
In considering maximum contribution rates, which most plans permit,
we don't mean to imply that everyone contributes at these rates. Indeed,
as shown by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2001), most low- and moderate-
income participants in 401(k) and similar tax-deferred saving plans ap-
pear to contribute at less than those rates. The most likely reason they
don't contribute to the maximum is that they are liquidity constrained
and find that every dollar they contribute requires a dollar sacrifice in
immediate consumption. The precise number of workers who contribute
at or close to the maximum levels is the subject of our ongoing research,
8 We assume that this ceiling grows at 1 percent per year.
9 The new tax law specifies that the contribution limits will be indexed to inflation after
2006. We think it is likely, however, that these limits will be adjusted over time for real
wage growth. In modeling other changes in the new tax law, we assume that they continue
after 2010 rather than revert back to their current values, as formally stipulated in the new
law.Who Gets Paid to Save? 125
as is determining the share of workers for whom marginal contributions
generate higher lifetime taxes.
Our method of determining the lifetime net tax benefit of 401 (k) partici-
pation is to compare lifetime taxes and spending with and without such
participation. But to make the comparison meaningful, we need to ensure
that the couple's gross income is the same in both cases. To do so, we
increase each spouse's earnings in the case when they don't contribute to
a 401(k) plan by the amount the employer contributes to their plan in the
case when they do contribute. Hence, in the no-401(k)-participation case,
this additional income is subject to immediate federal and state income
taxation as well as to payroll taxation.
In equalizing the pretax compensation across the two cases, we made
the standard economic assumption that workers are paid their marginal
productivity. Employer contributions to 401 (k) plans are part of a total
compensation package, where the total compensation equals the worker's
marginal productivity. Because workers can receive this total payment by
switching to an employer that doesn't offer a 401 (k) plan, firms that don't
contribute to 401 (k) plans will be forced by the marketplace to pay their
workers the equivalent amount in straight wages.
Indeed, if markets work appropriately, one would expect employers
offering 401 (k) plans to give their workers the option of receiving their
full compensation directly in wage payments or to receive it partly in the
form of employer 401 (k) contributions. Because most firms with 401 (k)
plans don't offer this option, workers who realize that participating in a
401 (k) plan is, at the margin, a tax trap have three options. The first is to
try to persuade their employers to make their contribution to the workers'
Roth IRA or other non-tax-deferred saving account. The second is to per-
suade their employers to pay to them directly what they would otherwise
contribute to the workers' 401 (k) plan. And the third is to quit and find
an employer who pays the same total pretax compensation but has either
no 401 (k) plan or a less "generous" plan.
The new tax law permits employers to make tax-deductible contri-
butions to Roth IRAs starting in 2006. But there is nothing to prevent
employers from making equal-size tax-deductible wage payments to
workers and, with the workers' consent, transmitting these payments di-
rectly to the workers' Roth or other non-tax-deferred saving account. The
only difference between what will be possible in 2006 and what is possible
now seems to be the fact that in 2006, the Roth contributions, like 401 (k)
contributions, will be exempt from the employer portion of the FICA tax
and will also be counted with respect to ERISA's nondiscrimination rules.
For workers who find themselves in a 401 (k) tax trap and can't persuade
their employers to make their 401 (k) contributions to them as direct wage126 Gokhale & Kotlikoff
payments or as contributions to non-tax-deferred saving accounts, switch-
ing employers, at least in the short run, may not be an attractive option.
Such workers may be able to cut back on their own contributions without
reducing their employers' contributions on their behalf. If that alternative
is not available, the workers' best strategy will almost surely be to remain
in the 401 (k) plan and accept having to pay higher taxes on a lifetime
basis; i.e., the value of receiving the employer's contribution will almost
always exceed the tax savings available from staying on the job but with-
drawing from the plan. Hence, low-income workers who read or hear
of this study should not immediately withdraw from their 401(k) plans.
Instead, they need to consider how much they are contributing, the tax
implications of their marginal contributions, and the employer contribu-
tion implications of the workers contributing less. If they find themselves
facing higher taxes at the margin by being forced or coerced to participate
in their 401 (k) plans, the first option, again, is to approach their employers
and request receipt of the employer contribution in an alternative form.
6. FINDINGS
Table 3 considers our stylized couple who has $50,000 in total initial an-
nual labor income and earns a 6 percent real pretax rate of return on its
investments inside as well as outside retirement accounts. The table is
TABLE 3




Earnings and social security
Earnings, social security, and housing
Earnings, social security, housing, and children
Earnings, social security, housing, children, and college
tuition 1.10 -0.39
Earnings, social security, housing, children, college
tuition, but no income taxation of social security
benefits -2.26 .50
* For a stylized couple with $50,000 in initial labor earnings that earns a 6 percent real rate of return.
Lifetime taxes equals the discounted actuarial present value of annual taxes paid through the end of life.
Lifetime spending equals the discounted actuarial present value of annual spending through the end of
life. The table shows the percentage change in lifetime taxes and spending from 401(k) participation,
assuming that the couple contributes fully to the plan and that, in the absence of participation, each
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based on the tax law prior to the 2001 legislation and shows the percent-
age change in lifetime total tax payments and spending from 401 (k) partic-
ipation. It begins in the first row with the assumption that the couple is
not covered by social security, does not own a home, has no children,
and makes no college tuition payments. The remaining rows add each of
these elements. For each case, the present values of lifetime taxes and
spending are formed using the same rate of return assumed in generating
the data. The figures in the table report the percentage changes in lifetime
taxes and spending.
If the couple has only labor earnings, 401 (k) participation is a terrific
deal, delivering a 26.2 percent reduction in combined lifetime federal-
income, payroll, and state-income tax payments and an 8.7 percent rise
in lifetime spending. However, once social security is included in the sce-
nario, these gains decline dramatically. The reason is the aforementioned
federal income taxation of social security benefits.
The addition of homeownership to the case transforms 401 (k) participa-
tion into a roughly breakeven proposition. The reason is that 401(k) partic-
ipation lowers tax brackets when the couple is young and consequently
the tax savings from deducting mortgage interest payments. If children
are also added to the equation, 401 (k) participation turns, on average, into
a bad deal. Children make 401 (k) participation worse because the value
of the tax exemptions for children is reduced when the couple's tax brack-
ets are lowered in their child-raising years.
Finally, if the couple also opts to pay their children's college tuition,
401 (k) participation really begins to hurt—specifically, it raises the cou-
ple's lifetime taxes by 1.1 percent and lowers lifetime spending by .39
percent. How does paying college tuition interact with 401 (k) participa-
tion? When the couple pays college tuition, it brings less regular wealth
into retirement. Given the structure of federal income tax brackets, 401 (k)
participation generates a bigger increase in tax brackets in old age than
occurs when there is more taxable income, including taxable capital in-
come.
To clarify further the importance of social security benefit taxation, the
last row of Table 3 considers how the household with social security bene-
fits and payroll taxes, children, housing, and college tuition payments
would fare from 401 (k) participation if the federal government did not
tax social security benefits. In this case, participation lowers lifetime taxes
by 2.3 percent and raises lifetime spending by 0.5 percent. Hence, federal
income taxation of social security benefits can change 401 (k) participation
from a good deal to a bad one for moderate-income households.
The findings in Table 3 show that the gains or losses from 401 (k) partici-
pation are highly sensitive to each particular household's economic and128 Gokhale & Kotlikojf
TABLE 4
Percentage Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k)




















































































* Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value of the couples' annual taxes and spending on
consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums. Each spouse earns half of the cou-
ple's total earnings. The table shows the percentage change in lifetime taxes and spending from 401(k)
participation, assuming that the couple contributes fully to the plan and that, in the absence of participa-
tion, each spouse's employer makes a direct wage payment in lieu of his or her former 401(k) contribution.
demographic circumstances. Furthermore, two households with the same
economic and demographic circumstances can end up with different
gains or losses from 401 (k) participation simply because one household
earns a higher rate of return on its investments than does the other (as
the next table will show).
6.1 Who Wins and Who Loses front 401(k) Participation?
Table 4 shows the impact of 401 (k) participation on lifetime taxes and
spending when our stylized couples earn either a 4, 6, or 8 percent real
rate of return on their regular as well as 401(k) assets. When considering
this table, note that because U.S. federal tax rate schedules are progressive
(average tax rates rise with taxable income), a given percentage change
in taxes translates into a higher percentage change in spending (with the
opposite sign) for high-income than it does for low-income individuals.
1
0
Look first at the couple with $50,000 per year in initial earnings. As
we've seen, if the couple receives a 6 percent real return on its assets,
1
0 Let S stand for the spending, E for earnings, T for taxes, and B for benefits, all measured
in present value. Then:
— = [T/(E + B T)YWho Gets Paid to Save? 129
401 (k) participation translates into 1.1 percent higher lifetime taxes and
a 0.39 percent reduction in lifetime spending. What if the couple earns
an 8 percent rather than a 6 percent real return on its assets? In this case,
the tax hike is 6.4 percent, and the spending reduction is 1.7 percent. On
the other hand, if the couple earns a 4 percent real return, 401 (k) participa-
tion leads to a 3.3 percent reduction in lifetime taxes and a 0.7 percent
increase in lifetime spending. This finding—that 401 (k) participation is a
worse deal if the couple receives a higher rate of return—may seem odd
because the gain from deferring capital income taxes is greater when the
rate of return is larger. Again, the explanation is that higher retirement
account withdrawals mean greater social security benefit taxation as well
as higher marginal tax brackets.
Consider next the table's finding for upper-income households. House-
holds with incomes of $200,000 or more enjoy a very significant tax reduc-
tion from 401 (k) participation, regardless of the rate of return. The rich
fare well, in part, because they are already in the top tax brackets and
can't be driven into higher ones by participating in a 401 (k). In addition,
the full 85 percent of their social security benefits will be subject to income
taxation regardless of their participation in a 401 (k) plan.
The super-rich, represented in this table by a couple earning $1 million
per year, don't fare as well in percentage terms as their somewhat less
rich counterparts because their 401 (k) contributions are subject to congres-
sionally imposed limits. Whether the rate of return is 4, 6, or 8 percent,
the $1 million couple enjoys a roughly 3 percent increase in its lifetime
spending. In absolute dollars, under the 6 percent return scenario, the
spending improvement corresponds to about $20,000 per year.
6.2 The Impact of Changing Social Security Benefit
Taxation
How would the gains from 401 (k) participation change if Congress were
to index the threshold limits, which determine taxable social security ben-
efits, for inflation? For the $50,000 household, inflation indexing raises the
nominal values of the thresholds and eliminates social security benefit
taxation in the no-participation case. But with participation, indexing the
limit makes no difference to social security benefit taxation. The reason
is that the 401 (k) withdrawals are so large that non-social security taxable
income exceeds the top limit, even if that limit is inflation indexed. Indeed,
despite the indexation of the thresholds, the full 85 percent of social secu-
rity benefits remains taxable. Given that indexing the limits lowers the
social security benefit taxes paid by the non-401 (k)-participating house-
hold and leaves unchanged the taxes paid by the 401(k)-participating
household, indexation makes participating in a 401 (k) an even worse130 Gokhale & Kotlikoff
choice. Another option is eliminating social security benefit taxation alto-
gether. Doing so changes all the negative lifetime spending changes in
the 6 percent column of Table 4 to positive values and reduces the size
of spending reductions in the 8 percent column.
6.3 The Implications of Future Tax Increases and Bracket
Adjustments
Table 5 repeats Table 4 but assumes that federal income tax rates will be
increased by 20 percent when the couple reaches age 65. For a low-income
($25,000) couple earning an 8 percent real return, lifetime taxes are
raised by almost 11 percent and lifetime spending is reduced by just
over 2 percent. In contrast, high-income households continue to benefit
substantially from their 401 (k) saving program. For example, at a 4
percent real return, a couple earning $300,000 enjoys an 8.2 percent reduc-
tion in lifetime taxes, which finances a 6.3 percent increase in lifetime
spending.
Indexing federal income tax brackets to nominal wages rather than the
price level is another policy we considered. This assumption precludes
TABLE 5
Percentage Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k)
Participation, Assuming a 20 Percent Higher Tax Liability After


















































































* Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value of the couples' annual taxes and spending on
consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums. Each spouse earns half of the cou-
ple's total earnings. The table shows the percentage change in lifetime taxes and spending from 401 (k)
participation, assuming that the couple contributes fully to the plan and that, in the absence of participa-
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real bracket creep (moving into a higher tax bracket as your real wage
rises) and means that our stylized households will be in lower tax brackets
during retirement. Nonetheless, this assumption makes little difference
to calculated gains and losses from 401 (k) participation.
6.4 Reducing Contributions
If fully participating in 401 (k) plans is a bad deal for low-income workers,
how would they fare if they reduced their contributions by 50 percent?
The answer to that question is, "Much better." For example, at a 6 percent
real rate of return, the $50,000 couple now enjoys a lifetime tax cut of 2.6
percent and a lifetime spending gain of 0.64 percent. Another way to limit
contributions is to stop contributing after a certain number of years or
to delay the onset of contributions. Either practice can transform 401 (k)
participation into a much better deal for the poor. The fact that low- and
moderate-income workers are likely to do better contributing less than
the maximum allowable amounts (together with the severe borrowing
constraints they are likely to face in making maximum contributions)
helps explain the findings in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2001) that 401 (k)
participants typically contribute only about 9 percent of their earnings to
their plans.
6.5 401(k) Participation and the New Tax Law
The low-income contribution tax credit provides, in the case of married
couples filing a joint return, a 50-cent tax credit for each dollar contributed
by the individual (as opposed to his or her employer) up to $2,000, pro-
vided adjusted gross income is less than $30,000. For gross income be-
tween $30,000 and $32,000, the credit is provided at a 20-cent-per-dollar
rate. And for gross income between $32,000 and $50,000, the credit is pro-
vided at a 10-cent-per-dollar rate. There is no credit if gross income ex-
ceeds $50,000.
Table 6 repeats Table 4 for the 6 percent return case for three different
assumptions about the evolution of the new contribution tax credit. The
first assumption is that the law is not changed, so that the credit is termi-
nated after 2006. The second is that the credit is extended, but the thresh-
olds for the credit aren't indexed for inflation. And the third assumption
is that the credit is extended indefinitely and the thresholds are indexed
for inflation.
For the $25,000 couple, the credit does relatively little unless it is made
permanent and is indexed for inflation. In this case, 401 (k) participa-
tion becomes a breakeven proposition. The reason that the credit does
relatively little for this couple, even if it is extended and indexed, is that132 Gokhale & Kotlikoff
TABLE 6
Percentage Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k)
Participation for Alternative Assumptions About the Contribution Tax






















































































* Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present value of the couples' annual taxes and spending on
consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums. Each spouse earns half of the cou-
ple's total earnings. The table shows the percentage change in lifetime taxes and spending from 401 (k)
participation, assuming that the couple contributes fully to the plan and that, in the absence of participa-
tion, each spouse's employer makes a direct wage payment in lieu of his or her former 401 (k) contribution.
the amount of the credit the couple receives is limited. The credit is
available only to the extent that taxes are actually paid; i.e., it is nonre-
fundable. Because the available credit each year exceeds the couple's tax
liability for that year, the couple never enjoys the full advantage of the
credit.
If the couple starts by earning $35,000, the credit is more effective
because the couple has more taxes against which the credit may be off-
set. Indeed, even if the credit is only temporary, the $35,000 couple will
still break even when one measures the policy in terms of its impact on
lifetime spending. If the credit is made permanent and indexed, the
couple will enjoy a 0.3 percent increase in lifetime spending. Of course,
this increase is still small potatoes compared with the treatment of the
rich.
Table 7 repeats Table 6 but with the assumption that the couple lives
in Florida, which has no state income tax. A comparison of the two tables
shows that the gains from 401 (k) participation of both the poor and the
rich are lower in Florida. This finding is to be expected because the tax
advantage of these accounts comes largely from tax-free asset accumula-
tion, and the lower the total tax levied on capital income, the smaller theWho Gets Paid to Save? 133
TABLE 7
Percentage Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k)
Participation for Alternative Assumptions About the Contribution
Tax Credit (Residence in Florida, New Tax Law, Real Rate


















































































* Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present values of the couples' annual taxes and spending on
consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums.
gain from being in a 401 (k). Since low-income workers in Massachusetts
were already experiencing a net loss from 401 (k) participation, moving
them to Florida leads to an even larger percentage increase in lifetime net
taxes from 401 (k) participation.
6.6 Optimal 401(k) Contributions
Table 8 performs the simple experiment of comparing the lifetime taxes
and spending for two cases—A and B—under the new tax law, assuming
that the new contribution credit is extended indefinitely and the thresh-
olds are indexed for inflation. For case A, we assume that all contributions
are terminated at age 45 and that the household earners receive grossed-
up wages after age 45. Under case B, we assume that full plan contri-
butions continue to be made through retirement (as under the last two
columns of Table 7). Table 8 shows the percentage change in present val-
ues of taxes and spending calculated as [(A/B) — 1] X 100. The results
show that when the rate of return is 8 percent, only upper-income individ-
uals benefit from continuing plan contributions beyond age 45. Under a
4 or 6 percent rate of return, middle-income households would do better
by terminating plan contributions at age 45. Low-income households ben-
efit from continuing to contribute at low rates of return because they con-
tinue to benefit from the nonrefundable credit at older ages when real134 Gokhale & Kotlikojf
TABLE 8
Percentage Change in Lifetime Taxes and Spending from 401(k)
Participation: Participation Through Age 45 Versus Participation
Through Retirement (Residence in Massachusetts, New Tax Law,














































































* Lifetime taxes and spending refer to the present values of the couples' annual taxes and spending on
consumption, housing, college tuition, and life insurance premiums. The percentage change is calculated
as [(A/B) — 1] X 100, where A refers to the present value if participating through age 45, and B refers
to the present value if participating through retirement.
incomes are higher and the resulting federal income taxes are sufficiently
positive to make the nonrefundable credit effective.
Table 9 presents optimal annual contribution levels for our stylized cou-
ples. For low- and middle-income couples, contributing between 4 and 6
percent is optimal in terms of minimizing lifetime taxes and maximizing
lifetime spending. Even a couple with $125,000 fares better if it limits its
rate of contribution, in this case, to 5 percent. For couples with yet higher
incomes, the contribution limit, which is $11,000 under the new tax law,
applies.
6.7 Contributing to Regular and Roth IRAs
Not all employers offer tax-deferred saving plans. For workers in such
firms, access to tax-sheltered saving plans is limited to regular or Roth
IRAs. The new law raises contribution limits from $2,000 to $5,000 be-
tween now and 2008 and then indexes the limit to inflation. Table 10 com-
pares the lifetime tax and spending effects under the new law of investing
either $2,000 or $5,000 in real 2001 dollars each year in either a traditional
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assumes, contrary to reality, that low-income workers can contribute
these same amounts. Finally, it assumes that the contribution credit is
permanent and indexed for inflation.
The first two columns of the table deal with contributions to regular
IRAs and repeat the lesson learned above that too much tax-deferred
saving should be avoided by low-income households. If the couple earn-
ing $25,000 makes a $2,000 annual contribution to a regular IRA, on an
inflation-adjusted basis, it lowers its lifetime taxes by 1.2 percent and
increases its lifetime spending by 0.2 percent. But if its real contribution
is $5,000 rather than $2,000, it raises its lifetime taxes by 38 percent and
lowers its lifetime spending by 5.5 percent! In contrast, contributing
the same amounts to a Roth IRA generates lifetime tax savings and spend-
ing increases in both cases. Lifetime taxes are lowered by 9.5 percent
and spending rises by 1.4 percent for the lowest-income households
when their contributions are constant in real terms at $2,000 annually.
When the contributions are maintained in real terms at $5,000 per
year, lifetime taxes are reduced by 9.0 percent and lifetime spending in-
creases by 1.3 percent. These percentage spending increases are larger
than those enjoyed by higher-income households if they, too, contributed
similarly to Roth IRAs but did not contribute to any other retirement ac-
count. This finding reflects the fact that a fixed annual Roth contribution
is an increasingly smaller share of earnings as household's income level
increases.
For households with initial earning less than $50,000 per year, tax sav-
ings and spending gains are both smaller when Roth IRA contributions
are $5,000 per year than when they are $2,000 per year. A similar result
is obtained for the same households if Roth contributions grow faster than
inflation by 1 percent annually rather than remaining fixed in real terms.
The explanation for this surprising result is that larger Roth contributions
leave the couple more liquidity constrained. Hence, when the second
child arrives, the couple spends less on that child's consumption if it's
contributing $5,000 to the Roth than if it is contributing $2,000. In spend-
ing less on the second child's consumption, the $5,000 contribution couple
saves more in non-tax-favored assets and ends up paying more taxes on
its non-tax-favored asset income.
Table 11 repeats the analysis of Table 10 but assumes that both IRA
and Roth contributions rise with earnings. The results are similar to those
just presented. Both tables show that a policy that eliminated 401 (k) and
other tax-deferred saving plans in favor of a constant or growing limit
on Roth contributions would be more fair than our current retirement
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7. CONCLUSION
The federal government has spent over 25 years encouraging all work-
ers to save in tax-deferred retirement accounts. In promoting participation
in such plans, the government has encouraged the belief that workers
would be saving taxes over a lifetime rather than simply on a short-term
basis. For those at the upper end of the nation's income distribution, tax-
deferred saving does, indeed, convey significant lifetime tax benefits. But
for those at the lower end, 401 (k) plans and similar tax-deferred retire-
ment accounts may represent a tax trap rather than a tax shelter. The
credit for retirement account contributions included in the new tax law
limits the damage to low-income savers, but does little to change the over-
all regressivity of tax-deferred saving incentives.
The good news for low- and moderate-income households is that con-
tributing to Roth IRAs is guaranteed to save taxes over one's lifetime.
Thanks to the new credit, these savings can be substantial for the lowest-
income households. Despite the credit, however, the tax gains remain
meager for most low- and moderate-income households compared to
those available to the rich from tax-deferred saving in general. If the fed-
eral government were interested in transforming today's highly regres-
sive saving incentive policy to one that provides the same percentage
lifetime tax reduction at all earning levels, it should consider replacing
the current system with a simple Roth IRA available to all workers with
a common but low contribution limit.
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